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The very first time that I taught criminal law, I would occasionally tell my
six-year-old son, Thomas, about selected cases and situations that I had come
across. Thomas enjoyed these discussions-more than I would have guessed: he
was captivated by the horror of Dudley & Stephens,' he was uncomfortably
intrigued by shaming punishments, he was appropriately outraged at all manner of
outcomes that seemed to him too harsh or too lenient. But most of all, he wanted
to test his own burgeoning intuitions about right and wrong, good and evil, the
permitted and the forbidden, against my "criminal law stories." He was, in a word,
excited by criminal law.
Criminal law provokes. It stimulates and incites. Criminal law often is taught
in the second semester of the first year, so it labors under something of a
disadvantage. It begins just after students have been faced with the realities of
their first semester grades. One might therefore expect some disenchanted
reticence-a bit of yawning 'plus-ga-change-isme'-but that has not been my
experience. More than any other course, criminal law challenges students to
confront the deep places of their own moral and political architecture, erected in
fragments over a lifetime, with realities that are, often enough, unknown and
frightening to them. At its best, criminal law induces alienation in students, shocks
the safety, piety, and certitude of their worlds. It does this, at times, by confronting
students with their own fears about their fellow human beings and demanding that
they reflect on those fears with care-not with the express aim that they should be
solved or overcome, but in order that they may be better understood.
Having canvassed admirably the historical changes to the criminal law case
book over the twentieth century, Professor Anders Walker's article 2 suggests that
criminal law ought to concern itself with the business of training future prosecutors
and defense attorneys by eliminating, or at least greatly reducing, the place of
moral and political reflection in the course, which was in any event the
supercilious indulgence of elite law schools that disprized criminal practice. His
normative prescriptions are of a piece with much that is currently in vogue in
criticisms of legal education: that it is impractical, that it does not respond to the
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I The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.).
2 Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political History of the
Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CluM. L. 217 (2009).
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urgencies of quotidian lawyerly concerns, and that it deludes itself that it ought to
be something like a liberal education. "That law schools should strive to produce
better citizens is hard to refute[,]" he writes, but "[w]hat good are ethics,
philosophy, and sociology if graduating students do not know the law?"3
This brief response to Professor Walker's article makes two points. First,
"knowing the law," in the sense that Walker seems to intend the phrase, has very
little to do either with what state prosecutors (to take the criminal practice with
which I am somewhat familiar) actually do or, more importantly, with the reasons
that lawyers decide to become criminal practitioners in the first place. Second,
adopting the normative prescriptions pressed by Walker will extinguish precisely
the excitement that criminal law can bring to the generally educated and interested
lawyer. There have been, and there will always be, few lawyers who become
prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys; no structural amendments to the course
will change that. But bleeding the criminal law course of the very ideas that
stimulate passion about the subject will ensure that law schools continue to
contribute to the stultifying process by which students forget, inexorably, what it is
that is worthwhile and fulfilling about becoming a lawyer at all.
1.
Professor Walker claims that we ought to reconsider Herbert Wechsler's mid-
twentieth century model of criminal legal education in favor of something more.
like the approach that preceded it: an assiduous case-crunching program in which
many cases were digested in order to develop a sense of the complex nature of the
common law, each case presenting nuanced differences in and subtle varieties of
approach to any given rule.4 Walker then wheels out the modern-day reformist
chestnut that this older common law method is optimal training in "how to think
like a lawyer."s What exactly is that?
Before turning to that question, and in fairness to Walker, his article is really
more about a historical development in legal education than a conceptual argument
about the essence of legal learning. As to the historical picture of Joseph Beale
that emerges from his piece, Walker seems to subscribe to the traditional view first
propounded by Jerome Frank, namely, that Beale believed that law was "an
authoritative source of legal rules, something to be revered rather than reformed."'
Recent scholarship has largely debunked this caricature of both Beale and many of
the so-called "formalists."8 Here is Beale in 1914:
3 Id. at 245.
4 Id. at 223, 229.
s Id. at 246.
6 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 55 (1930).
Walker, supra note 2, at 223.
8 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF PouTICs
IN JUDGING (2010).
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The vocation of our own age, then, is to study our law with a view
to its readjustment and reform. . . . [W]e must examine the law
objectively to learn its social purpose and to see how far that purpose is
being accomplished. Such a study is the object of the new sociological
jurisprudence. The importance of these investigations cannot be
overestimated. Every part of the law ought to be tested to find out how
far it is conforming to its purpose.
And here is Beale in 1905, little more than a decade after he published the
criminal law case book investigated by Walker,o on the nature of change in the
law:
The spirit of the time molds and shapes its law, as it molds and
shapes its manner of thought and the whole current of its life. For law is
the effort of a people to express its idea of right; and while right itself
cannot change, man's conception of right changes from age to age, as his
knowledge grows. The spirit of the age, therefore, affecting as it must
man's conception of right, affects the growth both of the common and of
the statute law."
Beale is speaking in both of these passages of the academic study of law, and
it is conceivable that he was directing these decidedly historicist and reform-
minded remarks at legal academics rather than law students. But two points are
worth making. First, in light of these statements and many others like them,' 2 it is
exceedingly unlikely that Beale would have completely insulated his students from
sociological, political, and moral reflection in his criminal law course in the way
that Walker claims-compelling common law prostration from his students or, in
Walker's colorful locution, forcing them to "kneel at the arcane oracle of the
common law judge." 3 Second, Walker's argument that we can guess how Beale
and his followers taught their criminal law classes simply by examining the sorts
of materials that were included in their case books is not convincing. These may
be more matters of degree than qualitative differences: Perhaps Beale emphasized
the reading and analysis of cases to a greater extent than is usual in contemporary
9 Joseph H. Beale, The Necessityfor a Study ofLegal System, 1914 AALS PROCEEDINGs 31,
39 (1914), quoted in TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 16.
10 JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES UPON
CRIMINAL LAW (1894).
" Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Development of Jurisprudence During the Past Century, 18
HARv. L. REv. 271, 272 (1905).
12 For similar "realist" reflections by Beale, see TAMANAHA, supra note 8.
13 Walker, supra note 2, at 239. It might be interesting to know whether Beale's course notes
have been preserved in Harvard's archives.
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criminal law courses. On the other hand, most criminal law case books today are
just that-texts littered with hundreds of cases aimed at developing analytical
dexterity-and so it is difficult indeed to know what conclusions about the history
of legal pedagogy to draw from Walker's evidence. At least on this record,
Walker's own rather aggressive conclusions are not warranted. 14
But it is Walker's normative claims that I want primarily to address here:
What does "thinking like a lawyer" mean to Walker? The critical component, it
seems, is that "thinking like a lawyer" means exactly not asking direct questions
about the law's political wisdom; it means knowing about the positive law, as it
exists in its great variety, full stop. This theoretical asceticism is what Walker
seems to admire about Beale's approach, though it gives the distinct impression
that Walker is far more "Bealist" than Beale himself. It is also what Walker
praises in Professor Paul Robinson's case book:
Paul Robinson . . . begin[s] each section with a crime scenario followed
by extensive statutory materials and only brief case excerpts. Following
each scenario, Robinson asked students to behave as practitioners and
determine "what liability, if any" existed under the prevailing law. At
first glance, this method marks an interesting turn towards a more
practitioner-oriented approach, one that pushes students to evaluate facts
as if they were prosecutors.' 5
Yet it quickly becomes clear that for Walker, Robinson, too, has been infected
by the Wechslerian virus of thinking deep thoughts because Robinson includes
"'discussion materials' that "provid[e] law teachers with the option of finishing
topics on a normative, policy-oriented note."' 6  Even the availability of such
materials, it is suggested, does not adequately respect the difference between the
legal is/ought distinction. The practice of law is one thing; its theory and wisdom
entirely another.
It is popular nowadays to call this the theory/practice divide (or gap, gulf,
chasm, etc.), and there is no denying that law school is in some ways a vocational
school, designed ultimately to prepare students for the practice of a particular
professional trade. Nevertheless the modishly overused (Professors Angela Harris
and Cynthia Lee gently call it "well-worn" 7 ) dichotomy of theory versus practice
tends to obscure the fact that "legal theory" is not a special type of fancy thinking
that people with pointy heads deploy to impress one another at conferences and
14 Walker claims that doctrinal similarities and differences were, for Beale, "all that students
needed to know." Walker, supra note 2, at 229.
's Id. at 243-44.
6 d. at 244.
17 Angela P. Harris & Cynthia Lee, Teaching Criminal Law From a Critical Perspective, 7
OHIO ST. J. CuM. L. 261, 262 (2009).
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symposia; legal theory is thinking about law. Legal theory is asking questions
about the law's nature and wisdom.
Walker goes on to claim that the earlier, case-crunching approach is well
recovered because it is likely to be more pedagogically in keeping with the
contemporary movement to emphasize "skills" in the "training" of lawyers,
including "the Carnegie Foundation's recent recommendation that law school
education return to an emphasis on legal practice . . . ."'8 Before getting to the
question of the appeal of such a vision for the future of the criminal law course, it
may be worth considering whether "thinking like a [criminal] lawyer" or the sort
of "skills training" that Walker advocates corresponds with the realities of criminal
legal practice-whether it is actually good, to say nothing of the best, training.
Professor Douglas Husak says much that I agree with on this score-that most of
criminal law is codified today, that a return to the pure case method approach
would be rejected by the Carnegie Report itself, and that training in negotiation
would be at least as useful for aspiring practitioners as learning the penal law
itself.'9 But Husak also indulges in the unfortunate academic snipe (unworthy of
such a keen thinker) that "the daily work of the criminal lawyer is an exercise in
what some commentators deride as McJustice," observing further that the criminal
justice system is in actuality no such thing and undeserving of the name (in
Husak's view, "a travesty of justice"). 20 Law, Husak concludes, is "irrelevan[t]" to
criminal practice.21
Since it is the education of criminal practitioners that is the subject of
discussion, it may be useful to know what at least one of them thinks of these
reforming proposals. I no longer practice, but my own relatively recent legal
experience was as a criminal appellate litigator for the state of Massachusetts for
just over two years, a position and an experience that I most definitely do not look
back on as a pointless and shameful exercise in "McJustice." While it may be
dangerous to generalize based on comparatively limited personal experience and
observation, such sources of information perhaps have some place in these sorts of
discussions, particularly because it is in state court (not in federal court) and as
prosecutors and defense attorneys (not legislators, or judges, or administrative law
specialists, and so on 2 2) that the overwhelming majority of criminal lawyers
practice.
With the obvious caveat that I cannot speak for all prosecutors, state
prosecutors, or even state appellate prosecutors, my own observations are that state
prosecutors do, in fact, know a great deal about the penal law. They rely on it
18 Walker, supra note 2, at 245.
19 Douglas Husak, Criminal Law Textbooks and Human Betterment, 7 Om1o ST. J. CRIM. L.
267, 270-71 (2009).
20 Id. at 271.
21 id.
22 Compare Harris & Lee, supra note 17, at 263 (emphasizing, too much in my view, these
other areas).
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daily in their fast-paced practices, and they are extremely well versed in the legal
issues that tend to arise frequently, so well that they can react quickly to many
complicated legal issues without needing to research them. Appellate
prosecutors-the group that might seem the most natural beneficiaries of Professor
Walker's suggested pedagogical reforms-are, unsurprisingly, even more
knowledgeable about doctrine, though not in the way that Professor Walker seems
to commend. They are not knowledgeable globally, inter-jurisdictionally, about,
for example, the felony-murder rule or the requirements of involuntary
manslaughter. Instead, their attentions are in the usual course trained on a
particular legal issue within a specific jurisdiction: not, "What is the law of choice-
of-evils?" but "What have Massachusetts appellate courts said about the 'no
adequate legal alternative' prong of the choice-of-evils defense where the
underlying charges are being a felon in possession of a weapon and driving under
the influence of alcohol?"
Since they are perpetually focused on the excruciatingly particular, appellate
prosecutors do not need to "think like a lawyer" in anything like the way urged by
Walker's hypothesized Joseph Beale. Instead, they need to be able to (1) research
and report on the relatively few cases that address their specific legal issue; and (2)
think creatively about how to analogize or disanalogize the facts of the litigated
case to (or from) existing precedent, or, if that is not possible, to argue that a
statute ought, or ought not, to be extended to reach the case under consideration.
None of this is earth-shattering news. It does tend to puncture, however,
some of Walker's claims about the value of the "Bealist" case method for criminal
practice. In the first place, there are often very few cases that even remotely
address a specific issue within a state jurisdiction, so there is little law to learn on
an issue that is complex enough to have been appealed. True, it can help to have
an understanding of the ways in which other jurisdictions have addressed similar
questions, particularly if there is no binding authority to be had. Even then,
however, the cases that are marshaled to support a point are, as a general matter,
few in number. All of the ineffable parsing, distinctions, and nuances that seem to
form the core of Walker's favored method of education are infrequently, if ever,
needed.
Second, what is necessary is a creative mind about the sorts of arguments for
extension or limitation of a law or precedent that are likely to move a court.
Thinking like a "hypothetical legislator"23 is not quite an accurate description,
since it is not the appellate criminal lawyer himself who is charged with law-
making or law-changing. But it is not so far off the mark either, since the skill in
demand is one of imaginative and persuasive argument-crafting. And in order to
develop that skill, extensive training in conceiving and developing arguments
about the purpose and wisdom of a law is absolutely essential.
Another point: The attraction of becoming a state prosecutor was, at least for
me, very much about just these sorts of concerns-about having a direct, albeit
23 Walker, supra note 2, at 244.
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vanishingly small, hand in the shape of a vitally important and interesting branch
of the law. Criminal law is intellectually exhilarating, and a good thing too, since
it is definitely not financially remunerative. I recognize that economic stresses
have made it more difficult for aspiring lawyers to choose a field simply because it
appeals to them, but given the low pay (in good times and bad), one has always
needed a reason to choose criminal law. One very good reason is the attraction of
public service, whether on behalf of the state or the accused. For me, and I suspect
for many appellate prosecutors, intellectual excitement was another important
reason. And I am far from certain that Professor Walker's rather insipid recipe of
four cups cases and no more than a pinch of political and moral reflection will be
edible at all, let alone sufficient to convince too many students to have a taste.
II.
I have claimed that criminal law is intellectually "exciting," "exhilarating,"
"stimulating," and the like. Someone might well object that much the same could
be said about other areas of law. Is there anything distinctively exciting in
criminal law, and do Professor Walker's prescriptions threaten to snuff that
something out?
I think that the answer to both of these questions is yes. One of the modem
textbooks that Walker criticizes as representative of the Wechslerian model 24 is
Joshua Dressler's Cases and Materials on Criminal Law, and one can sense
something of an answer to the first question (though almost certainly not the only
answer) by considering that book's beginning. Dressler opens with what may be a
familiar tract by Henry Hart, wherein Hart argues that what distinguishes criminal
from civil sanction is a certain type of community condemnation. Quoting
George Gardner and echoing James Fitzjames Stephen, Hart writes
that punishment is an "'expression of the community's hatred, fear, or
contempt for the convict' himself.26
This is of course a grossly underinclusive and overinclusive description. As
students proceed through the course, they meet many crimes and criminals that do
not elicit such responses in them (say, certain strict liability crimes, to take only
one obvious example). Likewise, there are many contemptible acts that are, quite
properly, well outside the province of the criminal law: "nothing is more evident,"
Herbert Morris keenly observed, "than moral evil outside the law's compass."27
24 Id. at 218 n.6.
25 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1-3 (5th ed. 2009).
26 Id. at 2 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 402-06 (1958)). The point was made elegantly by Herbert Morris, who argued that in
addition to being "'culpably responsible for legal wrongdoing,"' the criminally "guilty [actor] is in a
state deserving of some negative attitude, condemnation appearing the most apt term for this attitude,
and the delivered verdict of guilt provides a formal expression of this attitude by an authoritative
social organ." Herbert Morris, The Decline of Guilt, 99 ETHICS 62, 64 (1988).
27 Morris, supra note 26, at 69.
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And the degree of hatred, fear, or contempt that different crimes elicit in students
can be quite various. For some, drunk driving is deeply contemptible, for others
less so. For many, narcotics offenses, and particularly possession, are not at all
contemptible. Murder and rape tend to draw out emotions of fear and contempt,
but again, the degree and quality of such feelings varies substantially with the
particulars of the case. In one of the book's battered woman syndrome cases, State
v. Norman,28 it is the victim who is the object of intense contempt and hatred (and,
quite rightly, in light of his vicious, sadistic, and horrifyingly
interminable degradation of his wife), while the battered woman murderer is often
praised, or at least excused. Child abuse draws universal condemnation and
revulsion, even hatred, and the word "evil" seems ever to be just at the tips of
many students' tongues. I have had more than a few students tell me that they
were extremely uncomfortable just reading such cases precisely because the
facts stirred these disturbing emotions in them.
Yet I do think that there is something unique in criminal law that is captured
by Hart's observations, though it is not a quality that is conceptually necessary or
essential for all of criminality. It is a feature of several types of criminal acts and
actors, sometimes present, sometimes not, but rarely existing in other legal
contexts and subject areas-or if existing, not at all with the same intensity.
That quality, I think, is the interdictory uniqueness of criminal law. There are
certain types of human acts that, when combined with certain mental states,
do elicit intense fear, opprobrium, revulsion, and condemnation. These fears run
deep. Criminal law is a field where students arrive with highly developed
sentiments and opinions that bubble up and froth out of them. Their intuitions
about wrongfulness-about what must not be done-are rather muscular by
comparison with, say, their intuitions in civil procedure or professional
responsibility.29 Like all of us, they know fear. Certain crimes, and certain
defenses, too, elicit a powerful sense of foreboding.
If human beings will know fear, if their sense of foreboding is so keen, much
depends upon which fears they know most intimately. The fears they know best-
those with which they are most familiar-they want given voice by the powerful
interdictions and necessary denials of the criminal law. When the great "No! Do it
not!" of criminal law is transgressed, when one's deepest fears have been actuated,
there is not only the sense that punishment is owed to right the wrong, but the
rather more potent and much more problematic feeling that anything less than
a perfectly proportionate retaliation is unacceptable, intolerable. It is this sense of
forbiddenness, transgression, and-close on its heels-the desire for
commensurately severe punishment30 that laces a good deal of criminal law and
28 State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. App. 1988), rev'd, State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8
(N.C. 1989), excerpted and discussed in DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 532-546.
29 Certain intentional torts may be analogous, though even here I think that there may be a
qualitative difference from the emotions that various particularly odious criminal acts can elicit.
30 "Castigo," the Spanish term for punishment, better evokes the feeling in question.
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bathes it in dark hues. The ideas of the interdictory and the retaliatory are unique
to criminal law. And it may well be, in Philip Rieff's acute assessment, that
"[w]ithout credal prohibitions, deep inside its necessary, modem casuistries, our
law[] cannot help us govern ourselves." 3
Hart's passage remains a leitmotiv of Dressler's case book, needling students
to persist in their reflections about whether this or that crime does, and should,
dredge up the specters of fear, hatred, and revulsion that haunt the core of criminal
law. The sections on self-defense are particularly powerful in this respect, and not
only People v. Goetz,32 but the selections of pieces under the note, "Race and the
'reasonable person.'" 3 3 Here Dressler includes three pieces, two journalistic and
one academic, making different arguments about the relationship of
"reasonableness" in self-defense to race and racism. In the first piece, Richard
Cohen writes that racist fears by whites of African Americans may indeed be
reasonable in many mundane interactions, from entering a shop to walking along
the street.34 In the second, Rosemary Bray describes her fears when her African
American husband is late for supper: "I fear white men in police uniforms; white
teenagers driving by in a car with Jersey plates; thin, panicky, middle-aged white
men on the subway. Most of all, I fear that their path and my husband's path will
cross one night as he makes his way home."3 Finally, Professor Jody Armour
makes the obviously deeply felt argument that reasonable racism is a contradiction
in terms and that we ought at least to strive as a society and a political culture not
to equate the typicality of a fear with its rationality.
Throughout, students are stimulated to sense the strain and swirl among
conflicting values, impulses, and fears. How can racism, that rare modem
universal moral and political taboo, be legally reasonable? At what point should a
subjective fear become a basis for action that the law will excuse? That it will
justify? Even if most people think that under some circumstances, race
consciousness is reasonable insofar as self-defense is concerned, should the
criminal law demand more? Should the criminal law be an instrument of society's
highest aspirations? Should it be concerned with social, cultural, and political
improvement or should it instead content itself with comparatively minimalist
ends-not the perfect world, but the world as it is? Is fear a virtue, a vital internal
armament to be used liberally against a hostile world, or is it destructive, creating
its own evil as it does its protective work?
These provocations, and so many others like them in Dressler's book, excite.
And this remains true whether or not a student is actively contemplating a career in
31 PHILIP RIEFF, CHARISMA: THE GIFT OF GRACE, AND How IT HAS BEEN TAKEN AWAY FROM
Us 151 (2007).
32 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
33 DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 518.
34 Id. at 518-19.
36 Id. at 519.
36Id. at 520-23.
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criminal law. For those students who are interested in criminal practice, this style
of instruction illuminates the sometimes suppressed fact that the world of criminal
law, and so a career in criminal law, is intimately connected with the rest of the
world around them. The Wechslerian pedagogical mode cultivates an intellectual
link between a lawyer's professional and personal life, one which can be returned
to again and again for sustenance.
Studies and commentary that document the dissatisfaction of lawyers with
their work are legion, but explanations for the malaise for some reason have not
tended to dwell on the intellectual component of lawyer unhappiness. Lawyers are
accustomed to the stimulus of ideas; they have been sustained for the great
majority of their pre-practice lives on academic intellectual exchange. As much as
law students grouse about the burdens of legal education, and as eager as many of
them are for emancipation into the world of practice, my sense is that many harbor
the tacit hope that their chosen legal field will be at least somewhat intellectually
fulfilling. Perhaps some students pursue a legal career solely to sate a slavish
hunger for the profession's riches (though I doubt this can be said of those who
choose criminal law), but many are drawn to law because they in some measure
desire a career that will continue to nourish the life of the mind. Criminal law can
do this.
And what of the vast majority of law students who do not become criminal
lawyers? For them, Professor Walker's prescriptions seem even less apt. One
possibility that Professor Walker does not consider, but that seems to issue
naturally from his position, is that criminal law ought to be made an elective,
available for those who are already strongly predisposed toward criminal practice,
but not required for anyone else. There are at least two reservations I would have
about such a reform. First, it assumes that a class in criminal law is incapable of
persuading students of the intellectual interest and worth of criminal law; and the
assumption becomes a reality only because it is fulfilled by Professor Walker's
very own pedagogical program. Second, and more importantly, it presupposes that
criminal law has nothing to contribute other than the processing and digestion of
case holdings. Law here is viewed as a kind of liquid, the students as empty jars.
We pour in the fluid and it sits there, stored up and unused, until such time as a
client may need it for some practical end.
Again, I see no reason to make these assumptions. They run contrary to
everything that I have observed about the criminal law course and my own
students' feelings about it. It is admittedly difficult to know how to measure the
usefulness of criminal theorizing to the scores of practitioners who are not criminal
lawyers-how to quantify in economic or other utils the "value added" of political
and moral reflection. That is just as well. It may be better simply to think on the
kind of feelings that a successful class session of criminal law can elicit: an electric
buzz of excitement, genial interest in the workings of society's dark corners, and a
certain apprehensiveness and incertitude about one's own ideas, fears, and
prejudices. Surely, there is some value in that.
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Law students sometimes, perhaps often, come to law school expecting that
their professors will teach them the law, that they will learn it, and that both sides
will go their separate ways fully satisfied from the encounter, as if a complicated
math problem had thereby been solved neatly, tidily, and with no remainder. But it
is a significant part of the overlap between a legal education and a liberal education
to transport students out of the legal concepts and categories that are of comfort to
them, and to induce in them a sense of alienation and uneasiness. At its best,
criminal law cultivates that sense of foreignness and discomfiture; one of the
primary ways it does this is by demanding that students interrogate their own fears
when confronted with the bleak realities of the world of crime-a world which is,
though they may not know it, their own. As an object of study, criminal law is
indeed an "'instrument"' of "'human betterment' 3 7-not a Wechslerian device of
social engineering or a tool with which "enlightened leaders"38 can save the world,
but rather a type of learning that can enrich future lawyers' professional and
personal lives, within criminal practice and outside it. Even if students, in the end,
retain their own view of the particular matter at hand, it will invariably be all the
more interesting, sophisticated, layered, and complex from the engagement.
"Almost liberal arts," says Professor Sanford Kadish of the criminal law
39
class. One hopes that he continues to be right. Criminal law, as much as any
other legal subject, can awaken in students the realization that a substantial overlap
between legal and liberal learning does, in fact, exist-for them and, in teaching
them, for us.
37 Walker, supra note 2, at 227 (footnote omitted).
3 See id. at 230.
39 Id. at 220, quoting Interview with Sanford H. Kadish, Alexander F. and May T. Morrison
Professor of Law, Emeritus, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, in Berkeley, Cal. (May 19, 2008).
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